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CLAYTON ACT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND TOLLING
BY FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT
THE multiplicity of treble damage actions 1 brought as a result of the Gov-
ernment's convictions 2 in 1960 of electrical equipment manufacturers for con-
spiracies in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act 3 raises the question
whether the federal equitable doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls the four
year statute of limitations embodied in Section 4B of the Clayton Act.4 The
judicially created doctrine of tolling by fraudulent concealment was originally
applied only to bills in equity, but was subsequently extended to actions at law.8
It provides that a statute of limitations does not begin to run at the time of the
commission of the alleged unlawful acts constituting the plaintiff's cause of
action where a defendant has engaged in conduct intended to hinder or prevent
plaintiff's acquisition of information disclosing the cause of action.0 The tolling
of the statute of limitations ceases at the time the plaintiff discovers, or should
have discovered, the facts upon which his claim is based. Therefore, the plain-
tiff will have the full period of the statute of limitations, dating from his dis-
covery, in which to bring his cause of action. To avoid the ordinary effect of a
statute of limitations a plaintiff must generally establish that the defendant has
committed an affirmative act of concealment,1 and that reasonable diligence
would not have uncovered at an earlier date the facts constituting the plaintiff's
claim.8 These requirements are not easily met, especially the requirement of
reasonable diligence, which is strictly construed.9 Because conduct constituting
1. Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). See notes 29 and 86
infra and accompanying text.
2. For a concise account of the indictments and resultant convictions, see Application
of State of California, 195 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
3. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
4. 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1958). The statute reads:
Any action to enforce any cause of action under [the antitrust laws] shall be forever
barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued. No
cause of action barred under existing law on the effective date of this section ...
shall be revived by said sections.
5. Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1874).
6. Ibid.; Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 185, 190 (1884).
7. Bates v. Preble, 151 U.S. 149 (1894). If a fiduciary relationship is present, silence
on the part of the party against whom the cause of action would lie is sufficient conceahnent.
Young v. Howard, 120 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1941). The concealment must have resulted
from the act of the person charged; a fraudulent concealment by an agent will not bind the
principal unless the latter induced or had knowledge of the concealment. Bryan v. United
States, 99 F.2d 549, 552 (10th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 661 (1939).
8. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135 (1879). The plaintiff must fully allege the conceal-
ment in order to avoid summary judgment based on the bar of the statute of limitations.
The allegation, therefore, to be complete, must set forth the nature of the transaction, the
time of discovery, what the discovery is, how the discovery was made and why it was not
made sooner. Id. at 140-41.
9. See Wood v. Carpenter, mipra note 8; Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288
F.2d 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
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fraud, or unlawful conspiracies, generally includes acts intended to conceal the
offense from the plaintiff, the doctrine is most frequently invoked in those kinds
of claims. The doctrine applies, however, to all claims, regardless of their
nature, as long as the requisite element of concealment is present1
Four hundred and eighteen treble damage actions have been brought against
the electrical equipment manufacturers in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York."' Plaintiffs in these actions alleged combinations or con-
spiracies dating back to the 1940's 12 and discovery of the facts upon which their
claims are based from the date of the government indictments in 1960.13 In
answer to the motions of the defendants to strike from plaintiffs' complaints
all allegations of damages claimed for any period prior to the four year limit of
Section 4B, the plaintiffs contended that Section 4B had been tolled by the de-
fendants' fraudulent concealment.' 4 In Atlantic City Elcc. Co. v. General Elec.
Co.,15 the consolidated hearing on these motions, the district court denied the
motions. It held that the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit in Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co.'" was binding upon it and there-
fore the doctrine of fraudulent concealment was applicable to Section 4B.1
7
Thus, if the alleged conspiracies were in fact concealed, the Section 4B statute
of limitations would not begin to run until 1960.18
Moviecolor was an action on a thirty year old claim to recover treble dam-
ages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act for defendants' alleged violation of
the antitrust laws in suppressing competition in the manufacture and sale of
color still and motion pictures. Acts constituting the alleged violation occurred
thirty years before the commencement of the suit.'0 Prior to January 7, 1956,
Section 4B of the Clayton Act was not in force; the various state statutes were
used to determine the applicable period of limitations.2 0 The question before the
10. If a fraud is of such a character as to conceal itself, the statute of limitations will
be tolled until discovery. Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 185, 190 (1884). An integral part
of the element of concealment is, however, defendant's scienter. Either the concealing acts
*of the defendant are of such a nature as to show on their face that the defendant knew they
would conceal the cause of action, or, the cause of action itself is of such a nature that, on
its face, it indicates the defendant knew the plaintiff could not find out about it.
11. Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 61 Civ. 4258 and Related Cases, S.D.
N.Y., July 11, 1962.
12. Id. at 15.
13. Id. at 2.
14. The motions were consolidated and heard as one by Feinberg, J. Id. at 1-2.
15. 61 Civ. 4258 and Related Cases, S.D.N.Y., July 11, 1962.
16. 288 F2d 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
17.- Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 61 Civ. 4258 and Related Cases 9, S.D.
N.Y., July 11, 1962.
18. At the same time § 4B was passed another section was passed which provides for
tolling during the lifetime of certain government actions. Section 2, 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15
U.S.C. § 16(b) (1958). Absent the operation of this provision the plaintiffs would, without
fraudulent concealment tolling, only be permitted to claim damages for a four year period
dating backward from the time of filing the claim.
19. 288 F.2d at 82.
20. See Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1905).
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Moviecolor court, on a motion by defendant for judgment on the pleadings, was
whether "the federal rule as to the effect of concealment on the running of a
period of limitation applies to an action for treble damages under the Clayton
Act even when a state statute is used to measure the period." t21 The Second
Circuit decided that the applicable state statute of limitations would be tolled
if the complaint brought the plaintiff within the federal concealment rule.""
Judge Feinberg, the district court judge in the principal case, however, found
that the court in Moviecolor decided an additional issue :2
If the doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not apply to the action in
Moviecolor and, therefore, did not toll the four year time limit of Section
4B, then the action was clearly barred since the claim arose almost 30 years
before. Only if the doctrine of fraudulent concealment did apply and did
toll Section 4B was it necessary for the Court of Appeals to reach the next
question: was the action already barred by the state law before the effec-
tive date of Section 4B?
Thus, Judge Feinberg interpreted the Moviecolor decision as first holding that
Section 4B is tolled by the federal fraudulent concealment doctrine, and then
holding that the state statute of limitations could also be tolled by the same doc-
trine. He reasoned that the Moviecolor court must necessarily have recognized
the retroactive applicability of Section 4B,2 and therefore, must have decided
the issue of tolling as to Section 4B as well as the state statute of limitations.
But there is nothing in the Moviecolor decision to indicate that the Second
Circuit believed Section 4B was applicable in any manner to the case before it.
Rather, the Court of Appeals appeared to reason that, since the alleged unlaw-
ful acts and the discovery both occurred before the effective date of Section
4B , 25 Section 4B was not the statute of limitations to which the question of
tolling was relevant. The Second Circuit's reasoning was therefore confined
to the application of the federal fraudulent concealment doctrine to the New
York statute of limitations. 20 Thus this decision is not precedent for a finding
that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment applies to Section 4B.
21. 288 F.2d at 83.
22. Id. at 84.
23. Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 61 Civ. 4258 and Related Cases 9,
S.D.N.Y., July 11, 1962.
24. See note 4 supra for text of § 4B. It is argued that the first sentence retroactively
affects all causes of action accruing prior to § 4B, no matter how far back. See Atlantic
City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., supra note 23, at 8, 10.
25. The acts in Moviecolor occurred in 1931, 288 F.2d at 83. The discovery was alleged
on February 3, 1955, Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, p. 5, Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
26. This conclusion is supported by the fact that neither the appellant nor the respondent
argued the tolling of § 4B to any great extent in the briefs. See generally, Briefs for Plain-
tiff-Appellant, Defendant-Respondent, Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d
80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
Since the court concluded, however, that "there is no allegation that plaintiff did not
know ... whatever the facts were as to joint action by the defendants," Moviecolor Ltd.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., supra note 25, at 87, the plaintiff's claim of tolling by fraudulent con-
cealment failed. It is evident, therefore, that the Moviecolor decision was framed the way it
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The decision in Atlantic City Elec. Co. z'. Gencral Elec. Co.,- although the
only one seemingly grounded in precedent,28 is not the only decision dealing
with the question of tolling of Section 4B by fraudulent concealment. To date,
eight courts have decided this question in treble damage suits, all arising out of
the electrical manufacturers' indictments in 1960.P Of these, five courts, includ-
ing the Eighth Circuit, decided in favor of tolling,3 0 and three courts have denied
its applicability.31 Those courts which denied tolling found that the legislative
history of Section 4B and the absence of an express tolling provision where
Congress knew of the possibility of tolling were persuasive evidence of con-
gressional rejection of the fraudulent concealment doctrine.3 2 One court which
was because the court wanted to resolve the vexing problem of whether state statutes of
limitations, appended to federally created causes of action, would be tolled by the federal
rule of fraudulent concealment, even, though the state law provided they should not be so
tolled. This court, however, did recognize the existence of § 4B, and even adverted to the
possibility of it being tolled, id. at 84, alluding to colloquys of the 1955 Bill. See note 61
infra and accompanying text. This reference, however, was merely to support the conclusion
that the state statutes would be tolled by the federal doctrine.
27. 61 Civ. 4258 and Related Cases, S.D.N.Y., July 11, 1962.
28. See notes 16-23 supra and accompanying text.
29. In addition to Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 61 Civ. 4258 and Related
Cases, S.D.N.Y., July 11, 1962, see Public Serv. Co. v. General Elec. Co., No. 492-4 Civil
and Related Cases, D. N.M., July 25, 1962; Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., Civil
Nos. 13709-1 and 13710-2, W.D. Mo., August 3, 1962, reVd, Kansas City v. Federal Pac.
Elec. Co., Nos. 17,117 and 17,118, 8th Cir., November 6, 1962; United States v. General
Elec. Co., Civil Actions No. 29379 and Related Cases, E.D. Pa., August 21, 1962; Common-
wealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., Civil Action No. 61 C 1277 and Related Cases,
N.D. IlL, August 28, 1962; Public Serv. Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., Civil Action No. 7349
and Related Cases, D. Col., September 11, 1962; Brigham City Court v. General Elec. Co.,
Nos. C16-62 and C17-62 through C28-62, D. Utah, September 28, 1962.
There have been two cases not involved in the electrical manufacturers' litigation rmis-
ing the question of the tolling of § 4B: Gaetzi v. Carling Brewing Co., 205 F. Supp. 615
(E.D. Mich. 1962) ; Riuzler v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Civil Action No. 7427, N.D. Ga.,
October 30, 1962.
30. Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., .spra note 29; United States v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., supra note 29; Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., mipra
note 29; Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 8th Cir., supra note 29; Public Serv. Co.
v. Allen-Bradley Co., supra note 29. In addition, the court in Gaetzi v. Carling Brewing Co.,
supra note 29, decided that although the facts would not permit it tolling as a matter of law
would apply.
31. Public Serv. Co. v. General Elec. Co., No. 4924 Civil and Related Cases, D. N.M,
July 25, 1962; Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., Civil Nos. 13709-1 and 13710-2, WV.D.
Mo., August 3, 1962; Brigham City Court v. General Elec. Co., Nos. C16-62 and C17-62
through C28-62, D. Utah, September 28, 1962. The court in Rinzler v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., Civil Action No. 7427, N.D. Ga., October 30, 1962, decided against tolling.
32. See note 31 s-pra. One court, which denied tolling, wvas partially convinced by the
substantive procedural dichotomy, see notes 38-41 infra and accompanying text, by the bur-
dens which would be placed or the courts if tolling were granted and by the fact that § 4B
was primarily concerned with conspiracies. Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Ele. Co., supra
note 31, at 9-12. Apparently Judge Becker felt that, since conspiracies are secretive and
concealed by nature, tolling for any conspiracies would result in tolling for all conspiracies,
and that this would in effect destroy the statute of limitations for § 1 violations. See note
85 infra and accompanying text.
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permitted tolling concluded that a showing of contrary congressional intent was
necessary to prevent tolling,83 and found no contrary intent.84 Two courts found
the legislative history demonstrative of congressional intent to have tolling,t
and the Eighth Circuit decided that the nature of a conspiracy is such that Con-
gress must have intended there would be tolling in order to prevent conspiracies
escaping the full burden of the antitrust laws. 80 Despite these differing grounds
for decision, there was common ground for agreement: the question of tolling
was of great importance and there was a serious need to have the issue speedily
resolved at the highest judicial level.
Until this question is settled the scope of discovery cannot be settled by
the trial courts; the pleadings cannot be settled; the potential damages can-
not be computed; and settlement negotiations cannot be fully explored in
a great number of cases.87
These courts utilized three broad bases for decision: the mechanics of statutes
of limitations, statutory construction, and legislative history as demonstrative
of congressional intent.
The first ground is based upon the argument that Section 4B "cannot be
suspended on a non-statutory ground [fraudulent concealment] because it is
substantive and not procedural in character."38 Statutes of limitations charac-
terized as substantive are those in which the limitations are attached to or
directly aimed at a particular right, as when a new right is created and a period
is affixed thereto in which to bring an action.89 The theory behind not permit-
ting tolling of so-called substantive statutes of limitations is that the "liability
and the remedy are ... to be treated as limitations of the right,"40 and there-
33. Concluding that Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1874), an early tolling
case, demanded this.
34. United States v. General Elec. Co., Civil Actions No. 29379 and Related Cases,
E.D. Pa., August 21, 1962.
35. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., Civil Action No. 61 C 1277
and Related Cases, N.D. Ill., August 28, 1962; Public Serv. Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co, Civil
Action No. 7349 and Related Cases, D. Col., September 11, 1962.
36. Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., Nos. 17,117 and 17,118, p. 24, 8th Cir., No-
vember 6, 1962.
37. Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., Civil Nos. 13709-1 and 13710-2, p. 2, W.D,
Mo., August 3, 1962. And see, e.g., Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 61 Civ,
4258 and Related Cases 13, S.D.N.Y., July 11, 1962; Commonvealth Edison Co. v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., Civil Action No. 61 C 1277 and Related Cases 34, N.D. Ill., August 28,
1962.
38. Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 61 Civ. 4258 and Related Cases 8,
S.D.N.Y., July 11, 1962.
39. Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 511 (1915).
40. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 214 (1886). This has been a much relied upon dictum
for those interested in establishing a substantive-procedural dichotomy in the area of tolling.
However, this dictum was not made in. reference to the question of tolling, but in reference
to the question of a suit, with no excuse for delay, brought after the statutory period had
run. The Court refused to consider what effect an equitable excuse would have had on the
delay (i.e., a request for tolling) because "no excuse of any kind has been shown." Ibid.
It is improbable that the Court intended its words to be put to the use that the substantive
procedural dichotomy has put them.
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fore, when the time limit set by the statute has run, the liability, as well as the
remedy, expires and the right is extinguished. One answer to this argument is
that the right does not accrue until the prospective plaintiff knows, or should
know, that he has a possible cause of action. Moreover, it is not entirely clear
that Section 4B falls into the category of substantive statutes of limitations,
since it was enacted long after the rights to which it applies were created.41 Even
more important, however, the distinction between substantive and procedural
statutes of limitations is a tenuous one 4 and the argument that the right is
extinguished conclusory. As the Supreme Court has stated in an action involv-
ing the waiver of a so-called substantive statute of limitations:
Origin of the right is not per se conclusive whether the limitation of time
"extinguishes" it or "merely bars the remedy" with the accepted alternative
consequences respecting waiver. Source is merely evidentiary, with other
factors, of legislative intent whether the right shall be enforceable in any
event after the prescribed time....43
The question, therefore, is ultimately one of legislative intent; whether the
legislature, when it created the right and limited it temporally, intended the
cause of action to accrue even though the prospective plaintiff neither knew,
nor could be held to have known it existed.
Construction of the statute to determine whether Section 4B is tolled by
fraudulent concealment is equally indeterminate. Arguably, the language of the
statute suggests a negative answer: Section 4B is silent on the question of toll-
ing; Section 5 (b) 4 provides for tolling while a government action is pending.
Therefore, it might be inferred that Congress intended tolling under Section
5 (b) to be the only tolling permitted. This inference is reinforced by the fact
that statutes have been written which expressly provide for tolling until dis-
covery of the facts which constitute the claim. Thus, Congress has, where it felt
it desirable, written tolling provisions analogous to the doctrine of fraudulent
concealment in federal statutes.45 However, the Supreme Court stated in Holm-
41. The "substantive' rule, however, may be applicable even though the period of
limitatiorr is provided in a different, subsequent legislative act provided the subsequent act
is directed to the legislatively created cause of action. See Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451
(1904).
42. The rule removing "substantive" statutes of limitation had its earliest and widest
application in the field of conflicts of laws in cases involving suits on causes of action created
by a statute of a state other than the forum. Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., Civil
Nos. 13709-1 and 13710-2, p. 9, V.D. Mo., August 3, 1962. See RnZrATmmrnrT., Coi ucr
oF LAws § 605 (1935). The distinction, whatever its antecedents, is vitiated, however, by
the fact that the test to determine whether a statute of limitations is substantive or proce-
dural is not at all clear. Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152, 155-56 (2d Cir.
1955). See Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of L.ows, 42 YA.n L.J. 333
(1933) ; Comment, The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws, 28 YAZ L.J. 492
(1919).
43. Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 320 U.S. 356, 360 (1943).
44. 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16b (1958). See note 18 supra.
45. Statutes ex)pressly calling for accrual at discovery: The Tariff Act of 1930 § 621,
46 Stat. 758, as amended, 49 Stat. 527 (1935), 19 U.S.C. § 1621 (1958) ; The Securities
Exchange Act of 1933 § 13, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, § 207(a), 48 Stat. 903 (1934), 15
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berg v. Armbrecht, a case involving fraudulent concealment tolling of the Fed-
eral Farm Loan Act statute of limitations, that "[t]his equitable doctrine is
read into every federal statute of limitation." 40 Although this was stated in
dictum, it has often been relied upon by federal courts4 7 Given a presumption
of legislative notice of judicial interpretations, 48 the absence of an explicit tolling
provision in Section 4B is not determinative of the issue.
Nor, however, is the dictum in Holmberg v. Arnibrecht.49 Clearly the fraud-
ulent concealment rule was not intended to be read into statutes in which Con-
gress explicitly had denied its application. More generally, the Court, both be-
fore and since Holmberg v. Armbrecht,0 has applied a particular equitable
tolling doctrine only in the absence of evidence that Congress did not intend it
to apply (or refused to apply one where the evidence did demonstrate congres-
sional rejection)."' Since equitable tolling doctrines rely upon an act by the
defendant which forestalls a plaintiff from bringing an actiony 2 this experience
is readily applicable to the specific tolling doctrine of fraudulent concealment.
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that Holmberg v. Armbrccht 53 does
not demand that the equitable doctrine of tolling by fraudulent concealment be
U.S.C. § 77m (1958) ; The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18c, 48 Stat. 898, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78r(c) (1958) ; The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 323, 53 Stat. 1176, 15 U.S.C. § 77www
(a) (1958) ; Act of March 6, 1946, ch. 48, § 3, 60 Stat. 31-32, 31 U.S.C. § 131 (1958)
(United States may bring action on alteration of checks and warrants) ; The Federal De-
posit Insurance Act of 1950 § 7g, 64 Stat. 878, 12 U.S.C. § 1817(g) (1958).
46. 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (per Frankfurter, J.).
47. E.g., Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 821 (1961) ; Hicks v. United States Radiator Co., 127 F. Supp. 429, 430-31 (E.D.
Mich. 1955) ; Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
48. As when Congress re-enacts a legislative provision, it is persuasive evidence that
Congress has adopted that body of judicial construction. Missouri v. Ross, 299 U.S. 72, 74
(1936).
49. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
50. Ibid.
51. Thus, for example, in cases before Hohnberg v. Armbrclht involving tolling by a
general demurrer, AJ. Philips Co. v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 236 U.S. 662 (1915)
(Interstate Commerce Act), self concealing fraud, Exploration Co. Ltd. v. United States,
247 U.S. 435 (1918) (act for annulment of land patents), see also United States v. Diamond
Coal & Coke Co., 255 U.S. 323 (1921), and waiver, Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 320 U.S. 356 (1943) (Interstate Commerce Act), and in cases after Hohlnbery
v. Armbrecht tolling by administrative action, Unexcelled Chemical Corp. v. United States,
345 U.S. 59 (1953) (Walsh-Healey Act) and active misrepresentation, Glus v. Brooklyn
Eastern District Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959) (FELA), the Court concluded that mere
mechanical application or denial of equitable tolling doctrines was not warranted, but, that
the language and history of a particular statute must always control.
52. E.g., waiver, in which the defendant agrees not to plead the bar of the statute of
limitations should the plaintiff bring suit, Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania 11.R.,
supra note 51, self-concealing fraud, in which the defendant commits an act such that the
plaintiff could not discover it, Exploration Co. Ltd. v. United States, supra note 51, or
active misrepresentation, in which the defendant tells the plaintiff he will have a period of
years greater than the statutory period in which to bring his claim. Glus v. Brooklyn East-
ern District Terminal, supra note 51.
53. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
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read into a statute of limitations whose legislative history demonstrates a re-
jection of the doctrine.
The legislative history relating to the question of tolling Section 413, although
complex and at places unclear, does not demonstrate a rejection of the fraud-
ulent concealment doctrine.M Until 1949 no attempt had been made to amend
the antitrust laws to provide for a federally created statute of limitations.r Four
bills were introduced in the 81st Congress,"6 three of which contained provisions
for tolling in conspiracy cases, subject to the requirement of due diligence, until
the discovery of the conspiracy.57 These proposals were not well received, and
none came to a full vote in both the House mid Senate.Ys Congressional rejec-
tion of the 1949 provision has been viewed by three courts as conclusive evi-
54. See note 58 infra.
55. See Hearings on S. 1910 Before a Subconmmittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1949) [hereinafter referred to as Senate Hearings]
(remarks of Senator Donnell and John C. Stedman, Chief, Legislation and Clearance Sec-
tion, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice).
56. S. 1910, H.R. 4985, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) (both with the tolling provision);
H.R. 7905, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) (with the tolling provision) and H.R. 8763, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
57. Any action... may be instituted within six years after the accrual of the cause of
action hereunder; or, in the case of... conspiracy ... within six years after the dis-
covery by the plaintiff of the ... conspiracy, if the plaintiff has exercised due dili-
gence...
Senate Hearings 1. The tolling provisions in the remaining two bills are substantially the
same.
58. S. 1910, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) and H.R. 7905, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950)
had hearings, the other two did not. The tolling provisions of these two bills are hereinafter
referred to as the "1949 provision."
The hearings on two of the bills reveal statements condemning the tolling as too harsh
on defendants and encouraging excessive litigation. See, e.g., Hearings on HR. 7905 Before
a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 14, pt.
5, at 89 (statement of the United States Chamber of Commerce), 92 (statement of the
Association of the Bar of City of New York), 95 (statement of the American Bar Asso-
ciation) 1950 (hereinafter referred to as House Hearings) ; Senate Hearings 42 (state-
ment of Louis Nizer, attorney). The Justice Department and FTC both failed to make
statements supporting the provision in the first bill, although the Justice Department, noting
the difficulties inherent in discovering conspiracies, did support the tolling provision of the
second bill. See Senate Hearings 10-15 (statement of John C. Stedman, Chief, Legislative
and Clearance Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice), 15-16 (statement of
James AV. Cassedy, Associate General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission); House Hear-
ings 65. In addition to the four bills in the 81st Congress, there were three in the 82d Con-
gress (H.R. 3408, H.R. 1323, and H.R. 1986, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951]) and one in the
83d Congress (H.R. 467, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. [1953]) dealing with a statute of limitation
for the antitrust laws. Only one of these bills adverted to tolling (H.IL 1986, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. [1951]), the same tolling provision as S. 1910, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). Only
one of these bills (H.R. 3408, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. [1951]), had hearings and none yielded
committee reports. The bill which became the 1955 amendment was H. 4954, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1955). There were no hearings held on this bill; the House and Senate reports
on the bill utilized the aforementioned House and Senate Hearings supra, notes 38, 41.
See generally S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) ; H. REP. No. 422, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1955).
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dence of legislative intent on the question of tolling by fraudulent concealment.60
But legislative inaction is not a reliable indication of congressional intent.00 III
addition, arguably the 1949 amendment provision was different from the fraud-
ulent concealment doctrine in at least two respects. First, the rejected provision
called for tolling in all conspiracy cases until discovery of the conspiracy whether
or not there were any positive acts of concealment on the part of the defend-
ant.61 The fraudulent concealment doctrine, on the other hand, does not provide
for tolling in all conspiracy cases. In addition to the obvious case of a conspiracy
concealed by affirmative acts of the defendant, there are conspiracies recognized
by the courts as self-concealing in nature.32 Although it has been held that self-
concealing conspiracies are subsumed under the doctrine of fraudulent conceal-
ment,63 the 1949 provision and the fraudulent concealment doctrine would,
nevertheless, reach different results in the situation where the acts were found
to be conspiratorial but neither self-concealing in nature nor affirmatively con-
cealed (e.g., a trade organization which makes public its goals and practices).
To the extent that such conspiracies exist, tolling would occur in more cases
under the 1949 provision than under the fraudulent concealment doctrine. This
distinction, however, is likely to be of little practical significance, applying to
situations-non-self-concealing conspiratorial acts constituting causes of action
under the antitrust laws-which would arise infrequently. If susceptible to
possible challenge under the antitrust laws, business conspiracies are likely to
be affirmatively concealed by the parties. Furthermore, a showing of plaintiff's
due diligence would undoubtedly be a prerequisite to tolling under the 1949
provision even though affirmative acts of concealment need not necessarily be
shown.64 And it is unlikely that the plaintiff would be able to carry the burden
of proving due diligence where the conspiracy is neither self-concealing nor
concealed by affirmative acts. In those situations, the plaintiff presumably knows
that some act of the defendant has caused him injury. Knowing of the injury,
plaintiff would be held by the due diligence requirement to inquire into those
acts of the defendant which had injured him.G5 Since concealment would be
absent, and the plaintiff would be held to know or have the duty of ascertaining
those non-concealed acts of the defendant which gave rise to the cause of action,
tolling would ordinarily be unavailable in such cases. Consequently, this ap-
parent difference between the 1949 provision and the equitable doctrine of
59. See note 31 supra.
60. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 44 (1948) (Frankfurter, I., dissenting).
61. See note 57 supra.
62. American Tobacco Co. v. People's Tobacco Co., 204 Fed. 58, 60 (5th Cir. 1913).
"'Self concealment' of a conspiracy sufficient to toll the statute of limitations refers to
activities in furtherance of the conspiracy which by their nature defy detection." Gaetzi v.
Carling Brewing Co., 205 F. Supp. 615, 623 (E.D. Mich. 1962). See also Moviecolor Ltd.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 87 (2d Cir.), ccrt. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
63. Ibid.
64. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
65. Cf. Burnam Chem. Co. v. Borax Consol. Ltd., 170 F.2d 196, 209 (9th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 943 (1951).
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fraudulent concealment has no practical significance. But some Congressmen
may have considered this apparent difference a real one and rejected the 1949
provision because it would be too harsh on certain defendants and would en-
courage excessive litigation.60 Other Congressmen, either not aware of the ap-
parent difference or aware that it was not a real one, may have felt the amend-
ment superfluous, since the existence of Holmberg v. Armbrecht "r suggests
that the tolling embodied in the 1949 provision was to be read into every fed-
eral statute of limitations.68
The second apparent difference is that the 1949 provision was concerned with
tolling only in conspiracy cases6 9 while the fraudulent concealment doctrine
applies tolling to non-conspiracy as well as conspiracy cases. In conspiracy
cases, the acts constituting the cause of action will often be sufficiently self-con-
cealing 70 to validate tolling under the fraudulent concealment doctrine, while
a non-conspiracy situation will probably require an act of concealment in addition
to the act giving rise to the cause of action. Since non-conspiratorial acts are
ordinarily easier to discover than conspiracies, one might want to penalize a
defendant more severely for a further act designed to conceal violations of the
antitrust laws. Thus, it would not be inconceivable for a legislature to reject a
provision calling for tolling in conspiracy cases until discovery of the conspiracy
and still endorse the doctrine of fraudulent concealment as to all other antitrust
violations. In the perspective of the antitrust laws, however, the causes most ob-
noxious to the expressed policy have been denominated illegal per se, and cer-
tain conspiracies are included in this category of violations.7' It is difficult to
conclude that Congress, without any clear statement of intent, would have de-
cided to treat illegal per se conspiratorial price fixing 72 more favorably than
other less anathemized offenses. More importantly, those who favored fraudu-
lent concealment tolling in both conspiracy and non-conspiracy cases may have
been concerned lest the 1949 provision, if enacted, be interpreted as indicating
congressional intent to limit tolling solely to conspiracy cases.
73
66. See note 58 supra (statement of United States Chamber of Commerce, Association
of the Bar of the City of New York and Louis Nizer).
67. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
68. Id. at 397.
69. See note 57 supra.
70. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940)
(conspiratorial price fixing) ; Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (con-
certed refusal to deal) ; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 457 (1947) (tying
non-patented product to patented product).
72. E.g., United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., supra note 71; Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) ; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392 (1927).
73. Others may have rejected the provision because of the manner in which the bill
arose. The tolling amendment was urged at the behest of a private citizen. The plaintiff in
Burnam Chem. Co. v. Borax Consol., Ltd., 170 F.2d 569 (9th Cir.), ccrt. denicd, 336 U.S.
924 (1948) (his cause of action held barred because, according to the applicable state
fraudulent concealment rule, he should have known of his cause of action long enough for
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The highly speculative nature of the inferences derivable from the congres-
sional rejection of the 1949 provision suggest the difficulties inherent in relying
on that rejection as conclusive of legislative intent. The only conclusion a read-
ing of that legislative history clearly supports is the descriptive statement that
Congress, in 1949, rejected tolling in conspiracy cases until discovery of the
conspiracy.
The 1955 proposal for a federal statute of limitations governing antitrust
cases had no tolling provision and no new hearings were held.7" A series of
ambiguous statements relating to tolling were made, however, on the floor of
the House.7 r Although directed at tolling in conspiracy cases similar to that
proposed in 1949, rather than the judicial doctrine of tolling by fraudulent con-
cealment, these statements seem to imply that Congress assumed a tolling pro-
vision would be read into Section 43. Since those Congressmen involved in the
colloquies were consistent proponents 76 of express tolling provisions of the type
rejected by Congress in 1949, their statements should be read in the light of
their continuing interest in having such a provision read into the bill. Thus, an
answer to the question of tolling cannot be derived from the legislative back-
ground of Section 4B in 1955. In the absence of assistance from the legislative
history of the 1955 act, it seems totally unwarranted to conclude, on the basis
of congressional inaction in 1949, that in 1955, a different Congress, in accept-
ing a bill which did not mention tolling by fraudulent concealment, rejected
the application of the principle enunciated in Holmberg v. Armbrecht 17 to
Section 4B. Since this principle holds that in the absence of contrary legislative
intent, the doctrine of tolling by fraudulent concealment is to be read into every
federal statute of limitations, it is clear that, if followed, Section 4B is tolled
whenever a defendant affirmatively conceals the facts constituting a violation
of the antitrust laws and the plaintiff has fulfilled the requirement of due dili-
gence.
the applicable state statute of limitations to have run.) attempted to have himself legislated
back into court. He thought a provision calling for tolling until discovery of the conspiracy
would have revived his cause of action. However, since it had already been held that lie
should have known of his cause of action, which was the conspiracy which injured him,
passage of the amendment would not have afforded him relief. Thus, the peculiar circum-
stances which gave rise to the provision suggest two more grounds for congressional re-
jection: (1) it was a mistaken attempt to supplement Holmberg v. Armbrecht, and (2) the
provision was intended to benefit but one plaintiff. See generally House and Senate Hear-
ings, notes 55 & 58 supra.
74. See note 58 supra.
75. See, e.g., 101 CoNG. REc. 5129 (1955) (Mr. Celler: "In the case of conspiracy or
fraud, the statute only runs from the time of discovery.") Congressman Celler made sub-
stantially the same statement twice during later discussion. 101 CoNG. &c. at 5130 (remarks
of Congressmen Patman, Keating and Celler) and at 5132-33 (remarks of Congressmen
Patman and Celler).
76. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 3408 Before a Subcommittee of the House Comm itte
on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1, pt. 3, at 100 (remarks of Congressman Pat-
man'), 105 (amendment suggested by Congressman Patman) (1951).
77. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
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But reliance on this principle, which has its origin in dictum, albeit dictum
of the Supreme Court, seems to be a rather mechanical way to decide an im-
portant issue of policy under the antitrust laws. To be sure, it is desirable to
have a doctrine which will secure a plaintiff from loss of his cause of action be-
cause of fraudulent self-serving acts of a defendant. But a broad application of
the doctrine to an array of heterogeneous statutes involving differing policy
schemes and expressing a balance of numerous considerations may not be war-
ranted. Such an automatic application may upset the balance achieved in any
one statute.78 Therefore, it is arguable that the rule enunciated in Holnbcrg v.
Armbrecht 79 should not decide the issue of tolling of all federal statutes of
limitations, and that the courts should weigh the effects of the application of the
doctrine in regard to the policy scheme of the particular statute in question.
Judicious use of a flexible equitable doctrine presupposes a weighing of the
interests affected by its application.
Such an examination in respect to the antitrust laws or to particular pro-
,visions of these laws is no easy task. But it is one courts must undertake unless
they are to continue to decide the tolling issue on the inconclusive grounds set
out above or on the basis of a dictum whose implications were never considered
in the context of the antitrust laws. The following is not an attempt to resolve
the question, but to set out some of the factors a court should consider in decid-
ing this issue in respect to Section 4B.
Treble damage actions in the framework of the antitrust laws are intended to
compensate persons injured by proscribed business practices 8 0 and to deter per-
sons from engaging in such activities.81 The significance of the private treble
damage suit in the enforcement mechanism of the antitrust laws has often been
noted ;82 private treble damage plaintiffs have been characterized as "allies of
the government in enforcing the antitrust laws."' a Conspiracies which violate
the antitrust laws are frequently concealed by potential defendants or are self-
concealing in nature ;8 thus it may be extremely difficult for potential treble
damage plaintiffs to discover violations within the statutory four year period
in which suit must be commenced. Thus, it seems clear that denying application
of the doctrine would greatly reduce potential liability and thus the deterrent
78. As in the Interstate Commerce Act where Congress has demonstrated an intention
to have uniformity the central theme of the statutory scheme. See Philips v. Grant Trunk
Ry., 236 U.S. 662 (1915).
79. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
80. United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573, 581 (1948).
81. CIR v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 217 F.2d 56, 61 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 982 (1955).
82. E.g., Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4
AxTrERUST Bui. 5 (1959); Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Anti-
trust, 3 AN-TIRUST BUtl,. 167 (1958); Wham, Antitrust Treble-Damage Suits: The Gov-
ernment's Chief Aid in Enforcement, 40 A.B.AJ. 1061 (1954).
83. 51 CONG. Rac. 16319 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Floyd). For a discussion of
treble damage actions in a different context, see Note, Discouragement of Private Treble
Damage Suits Through a Simple Refusal to Deal, 71 YAL= L.J. 1565 (1962).
84. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
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effect of the treble damage provisions of the antitrust laws. Furthermore, it
should be recognized that application of the doctrine would not necessarily give
rise to excessive litigation of stale claims. For plaintiffs have had enormous
difficulty in the past proving claims of fraudulent concealment.,, Consequently,
the decision that fraudulent concealment is available to toll Section 4B does not
demand that there would be widespread tolling.
On the other hand, the instant case illustrates some of the detrimental effects
application of the doctrine to Section 4B may have. In this litigation, there are
close to 1,800 suits, 6 each with multiple claimants, multiple defendants and
multiple claims, running back at least as far as twenty years.8 7 The complexity
of administrative problems facing the court from sheer numbers, the possibility
of devastating liability severely injuring an entire industry, as well as affecting
stock and other markets, and the adverse effects tolling might have on the num-
ber of out of court settlements are all factors which may indicate that tolling
in the antitrust laws would not be desirable. A court could conclude that the
likelihood of these factors in antitrust suits is so great that the doctrine should
not be read into Section 4B. If a court is convinced that tolling Section 4B is
likely to have undesirable economic repercussions and confound the operation
of the courts, it could decide to reject tolling for liaiblity purposes, thereby
reducing the probability of excessively burdensome liability as well as multi-
plicity of claims.
The possibility of applying the tolling doctrine for some purposes and not for
others also should not be overlooked. Thus, for example, tolling may be utilized
to alleviate problems plaintiffs may face in making discovery, 8  although the
doctrine is rejected as to the liability of antitrust defendants. Discovery for
complex antitrust litigation may be consolidated in a nationwide discovery pro-
ceeding, as in the instant case,89 thereby reducing the burden of repetitive and
inefficient discovery. Where plaintiffs demonstrate that if denied discovery be-
yond the four year period they would be unable to substantiate their damage
claim within the four year period, a court could decide that tolling for discovery
85. See, e.g., Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 87 (2d Cir.), cerl.
denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961) ; Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax Consol,, 185 F.2d 196,
209 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 943 (1951) ; Burnam Chem. Co. v. Borax Con-
sol., 170 F.2d 569, 577 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 924 (1948) ; Gaetzi v. Carling
Brewing Co., 205 F. Supp. 615, 623 (E.D. Mich. 1962) ; Zimmerer v. General Elec. Co., 120
F. Supp. 690, 693 (D. Corn. 1954).
Allegations are read with close particularity; due diligence is strictly construed and not
easily found. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 140 (1879) ; Moviecolor Ltd. v. East-
man Kodak Co., supra.
86. Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 61 Civ. 4258 and Related Cases 5,
S.D.N.Y., July 11, 1962.
87. Id. at 15.
88. Plaintiffs ordinarily would have stringent proof requirements to be able to get cer-
tain types of discovery. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34. The courts could relieve this stringency by
the suggestion in the text which could act as a conclusive showing of relevancy,
89. Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., Civil Nos. 13709-1 and 13710-2, p. 2, W.D.
Mo., August 3, 1962.
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purposes only would neither inconvenience the courts nor burden the defendants
unduly. Whatever choice is eventually made, however, it seems clear that a con-
sideration of the above and other factors is a preferable basis for decision of
the applicability of the fraudulent concealment doctrine to Section 4B than the
unquestioning application of the dictum in Hohnbcrg v. Armbrccht 00 or the
questionable grounds utilized by the courts to date.
90. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
